The Economic Implications of Early Military Assistance to Western Europe under the Truman Administration, 1949-1951

My aim in this research is to frame the early years of U.S. military
assistance to Western Europe within the context of economic,
financial, and industrial issues. I focus on military support for the
West European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
countries from mid-1949 through the end of the administration of
Harry S. Truman in 1952. I argue that during this period the
United States changed its approach to the economic dimensions of
rearmament. I trace the main features of the first military aid
program, a bilateral assistance program based on a widespread
fear that military aid would impair the ongoing economic recovery
promoted by the Marshall Plan; and a strengthening of military
security in Europe aimed at reinforcing existing military forces
rather than promoting new defense industries. I also address the
structure of mutual security in 1950-51 as a multilateral
rearmament program, touching on the main limits of military
assistance and its procedures as they affected transatlantic
relations. The reorganization of military aid to Europe with
offshore procurement programs after 1952 was closely linked to a
new concept elaborated by the Truman administration in which
rearmament could promote development and aid economic
recovery.